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Abstract 
 
Our purpose in this paper is to highlight the role of organizational structure and 
incentives in the design of contracts between buyers and sellers of agricultural products.  
In particular, we consider how differences between investor-owned (IOF) and producer-
oriented (POF) firms, and differences between alternate types of POFs, may affect the 
types of contract terms those respective organizations are likely to prefer in their 
contracts with agricultural producers.  New institutional economics theories of 
contracting, agency and property rights allocation suggest that cooperative contractors 
may be able to design contracts that enhance economic efficiency that IOFs cannot easily 
replicate 
                                                 
?  Sykuta is Assistant Professor of Agribusiness in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the 
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A New Institutional Economics Approach to Contracts and Cooperatives 
 
Consolidation and increased coordination throughout the agri- food sector are 
rapidly reshaping the role of cooperative organizations in agriculture.  Increased 
concentration, both up and downstream, raises the specter of the traditional cooperative 
role of counter-balancing market power.  However, increasing demands for coordination 
among players throughout the agri- food system point to a different role in which 
cooperative organizations may have a unique advantage.   
Particularly at the producer level, where large-scale vertical integration of 
productive resources is relatively impractical, contracting plays a critical role in 
coordinating the activities and interests of trading parties in agriculture.  The structure of 
these myriad contractual arrangements is only beginning to be explored (Sykuta and 
Parcell).  While some researchers have studied the effects of differentiated producer 
characteristics on contract performance (e.g., Goodhue), little attention has been paid to 
the identity or nature of the contracting organization when examining the structure of 
agricultural contracts.   
However, one might think it reasonable to suggest that a producer-owned 
contractor should be better able to contract with (owner-member) producers than would 
an investor owned firm (IOF).  Indeed, Balbach found that contracts between sugar beet 
producers and producer-owned refiners were not only structured differently than those 
with investor-owned refiners, but they were different in a manner that improved both 
processing efficiency and producer returns.  This is but one example of one particular 
dimension of contract design (namely, the interface between quality-attribute 
measurement and organizational structure), but it is suggestive of a broader implication.   
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The purpose of this paper is to proffer a comparative conceptual framework that 
examines efficiency implications for contracting parties depending on the ownership 
structure of the contractor.  New institutional economics theories of contracting, agency 
and property rights allocation suggest that cooperative contractors may be able to design 
contracts that enhance economic efficiency that IOFs cannot easily replicate. Moreover, 
issues of vaguely defined property rights characteristic of traditional cooperative 
structures (Cook) also affect the viable contractual forms, suggesting certain producer 
owned and controlled organizations may have additional advantages in certain types of 
contracting arrangements that will be more attractive to member/producers.  
In this paper, we focus on potential contractual design differences between IOFs, 
traditional marketing cooperatives, and new forms of cooperation including closed 
membership cooperatives.  Beginning with a brief overview of the fundamental 
dimensions of the economics of transactions, we go on to discuss how differences in 
organizational structure (property rights allocations, incentives, and performance 
measures) affect the incentives of the contracting parties and the likely contractual design 
response.  We conclude with a summary of testable implications that form the basis of a 
continued research agenda. 
 
Fundamental Elements of Contract Design 
 Every transaction relationship involves three basic economic components: the 
allocation of value (or the distribution of gains from trade), the allocation of uncertainty 
(and any associated financial risks), and the allocation of property rights to decisions 
bearing on the relationship.  These three dimensions are inherently interdependent; each 
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one is likely to have implications for the others.  For instance, a producer may demand a 
higher price for assuming the uncertainty of growing a new product or variety.  A buyer 
may offer a price premium on the product in return for the right to assert certain terms 
with respect to production decisions (e.g., handling/segregation).  A fixed price contract 
eliminates nominal price uncertainty, but may create financial risks for either side as 
relative market prices change, for either inputs or related products.  A fixed price contract 
may also affect either party’s incentives and the way they exercise their respective 
decision rights, particularly with regard to product quality. 
Traditional neoclassical economics offers little insight into how such economic 
relationships should be structured.  By focusing on a frictionless market as the unit of 
analysis, where price and quantity are the variables of primary interest, the 
multidimensional nature of an individual transaction is necessarily overlooked.  To the 
extent that “extraneous” factors come into play (e.g., risks from price uncertainty), 
market solutions such as a futures market are assumed effective solutions. 
New institutional economic theories of agency, property rights, incomplete 
contracting and Williamson’s transaction cost economics have been advanced to provide 
a finer theoretical focus by which to analyze the structure of transactions and their 
governing institutions.1  These theories suggest how the rights and responsibilities 
incumbent to the transaction are allocated will depend on the characteristics of the 
transaction, the costs of monitoring and enforcement, the relationship of the trading 
parties, and their respective negotiating skills or bargaining position (which might be 
influenced by control rights over complementary assets).2   
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Agency theory addresses information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility 
between trading parties.  Although commonly considered in the context of the employer-
employee or principal-agent relationship (Fama, Jensen and Meckling), it applies as well 
in all cases wherein one party has an informational advantage over another that can be 
exploited to the benefit of the advantaged party at the expense of her trading partner 
(Salanié).  Implicit in that statement is the assumption that the information asymmetry is 
costly to correct.  Those costs may include ex ante search costs (associated with adverse 
selection (hidden information) problems) and/or ex post monitoring and enforcement 
costs (associated with moral hazard (hidden action) problems).   
The resulting focus is on developing contracts that align incentives (i.e., 
encourage truthful information revelation) while at the same time addressing 
measurement (or monitoring) issues.  While Jensen and Meckling focus on the 
combination of value and risk allocations in designing effective incentive systems, the 
delegation of decision rights also plays a significant role.  Indeed, an agency problem 
exists only because the agent is assigned decision (or control) rights that affect the 
principal’s wealth or utility function (typically, his claims to the residual income 
generated by the asset).  To the extent that contracting organizations embody different 
incentive systems, a greater degree of information asymmetry, or more costly monitoring, 
one would expect that contractual relations would also differ among the organizations. 
Since Coase’s 1960 classic, “The Problem of Social Cost,” economists have 
become concerned with how the assignment of and costs of transferring property rights 
affect incentives and economic outcomes.  Recognizing that most assets or products are 
characterized by multiple attributes, and that property rights to these various attributes 
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may belong to different people, points to the importance of organizational form in 
mitigating property rights issues, particularly commons property (Barzel, De Alessi).  
The separation of residual claim rights and control rights in modern corporations, though 
dating back to Berle and Means, is perhaps the best noted example in the work tying 
property rights to organizational form.3 
This property rights perspective forms the basis of the arguments Cook makes 
regarding the evolution of cooperatives and the rise of the “new generation” cooperative 
structure.  He defines five “vaguely defined property rights” problems devolving from the 
traditional cooperative organization’s division of residual claims and control rights: Free 
Rider Problem, Horizon Problem, Portfolio Problem, Control Problem, and Influence 
Costs Problem.  The Free Rider Problem results when gains from cooperative action can 
be accessed by individuals that did not fully invest in developing the gains, whether those 
individuals are new(er) members or non-members.  The Horizon Problem results from 
residual claims that do not extend as far as the economic life of the underlying asset.  
Like the Horizon Problem, the Portfolio Problem stems from the tied nature of the equity 
in the cooperative; the organization’s investment portfolio may not reflect the interests or 
risk attitudes of any given investor/member, but members cannot withdraw and reallocate 
their investments.  The Control Problem is similar in nature to the shareholder-manager 
problem in IOFs, but is compounded by the lack of external competitive market pressures 
(e.g., equity markets and the market for corporate control) that help discipline managers 
in IOFs.  Influence Costs are incumbent to all organizations where decisions affect wealth 
distribution among members.  These costs are greater when there is a wider variety of 
interests among group members and when the potential gains are greater.   
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Cook asserts that these different incentive problems increase the transaction costs 
of managing the cooperative organization.  He goes on to conjecture how different 
cooperative types, reflecting different property right constraints, may be more or less 
affected by each of these five types of problems.  Cook and Iliopoulos later demonstrate 
that these vaguely defined property rights problems affect members’ incentives to invest 
in the organization and the organization’s overall ability to generate equity capital.  
Specifically, they find that members are more willing to invest equity when the 
cooperative is characterized by structures such as closed membership, marketing 
agreements, and transferable and appreciable equity shares; structures that tend to reduce 
the free rider, horizon, and portfolio problems. 
Incomplete contract theory builds on property right themes in attempt to prescribe 
optimal asset ownership based on residual control rights of an asset (Hart, Hart and 
Moore).  Residual control rights are defined as the right or ability to control access to or 
use of an asset in any circumstance not otherwise prescribed under contract.  In legal 
parlance, these residual control rights are the effective default rules that apply when the 
terms of the formal contract are incomplete.  Given contractual incompleteness, the story 
goes, ownership of assets should be arranged to maximize investment incentives and 
returns.4  More important to this paper is the corollary: given asset ownership, the degree 
of completeness in a contract, i.e., the degree to which contingencies are more fully 
specified will depend on the allocation of residual control rights over the related asset.   
Transaction cost economics (TCE), as popularized by Williamson, also tends to 
focus on firm boundary issues—under what conditions an activity will be organized in an 
integrated, hierarchical manner versus in a more arms- length contractual manner.  
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However, governance mechanisms can be viewed in a continuum ranging from 
anonymous spot market transacting to an autocratic hierarchy, with a range of varying 
degrees (sometimes called hybrids) in between.  TCE analysis tends to focus particularly 
on the roles of asset specificity and bounded rationality, in the context of opportunistic 
decision behavior, as the key determinants of organizational form.  Three other 
transaction attributes, complexity, uncertainty and frequency, are also discussed by 
Williamson, but tend to be de-emphasized in the final analysis.  The general implications 
are that as assets involved in a transaction are more specific to the transaction, as the 
potential for opportunistic behavior increases, and as the need for coordination between 
parties increases, the more likely hierarchical mechanisms will be used to govern the 
transaction.  In the context of contractual governance mechanisms, this suggests more 
fully specified terms with more decision rights vested in the contractor. 
A common theme across all of these approaches is that transaction costs are 
positive; information is imperfect, costly, and frequently asymmetric; the allocation of 
decision rights (or property rights more generally) affects performance; and governance 
structures are designed to mitigate the hazards, or minimize the costs, involved in 
effecting economic transactions.  While the frequent focus is on firm boundary questions, 
the concepts also directly apply to alternative contractual governance forms.   
 
Coordination, Contracting and Organizational Structure  
 The agri- food system is increasingly characterized by demand for greater 
coordination between players at every level.  Demand for extra-sensory attributes by 
consumers, realization of processing production efficiencies from using more consistent 
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inputs, and the increasing trait specialization of agricultural products all push toward 
greater control and coordination.  Particularly at the producer level, the most practical 
coordination mechanism is contracting.  The central premise of this paper is that 
contractors with different organizational structures may use different contract forms even 
when contracting for the same product from the same set of agricultural producers.  
Moreover, the differences in contract form will be a directly related to the nature of the 
contractors’ organizational structures and the incentives they create.5 
That IOFs and producer-owned cooperatives are different is generally understood.  
For most IOFs, a diverse and diffuse set of equity investors shares proportional (and 
perhaps atomistic) ownership rights to the residual income of the organization.  Few 
investors have any other business ties to the organization than their equity investment 
(and perhaps managerial control), and all residual income is distributed based solely on 
equity shares.  These rights are fully transferable and appreciable, allowing investors to 
alter their own investment portfolio to meet their personal investment objectives at 
relatively low cost while being able to capture the fully capitalized value of their 
investment.   
The relationship between the IOF and its input suppliers can be characterized as a 
zero-sum game: any increase in payments to inputs is a decrease in residual income for 
investors.  The IOF has no inherent interest in the welfare of its input suppliers.  Because 
of this zero-sum nature of the IOF-supplier relationship, there is an inherent element of 
distrust between parties.  Both sides recognize the incentive to withhold private 
information that may provide its owner greater returns.  As a result, at least a perception, 
if not a reality, of greater information asymmetry prevails.   
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Producer-owned cooperatives (traditionally speaking) have a very different 
property rights structure.  In this context, ownership of the organization takes on a very 
different meaning.  While producer-owners have equity investments in the organization, 
residual income is distributed based not on equity investment, but on the patronage of or 
business dealings with the organization.  Here the relationship between the cooperative 
and its input suppliers is not necessarily a zero-sum game, since a higher price to inputs 
represents an equivalent payment to (some) investors; the residual income is simply paid 
in the form of higher prices to the producer (or in the case of a supply cooperative, in the 
form of discounts to the producer). 
Given their producer-owned and producer-governed nature, cooperatives have an 
inherent producer orientation.  Moreover, because producers are involved in the 
governance of the organization, there is a lesser degree of perceived information 
asymmetry—the incentive to withhold information is lower since producers are involved 
on both sides of the transaction.  Both of these suggest a greater degree of trust between 
producers and the organization than in the IOF-producer relationship.6   
This simple dichotomous scenario already suggests differences in the ways 
contracts may be structured based on the different property rights structures, information 
asymmetries, and trust levels associated with IOFs and traditional producer oriented firms 
(POFs).  In particular, we suggest that: 
1. Because of the lower level of trust and greater information asymmetry, IOF 
contracts will rely on more transparent and easily verified measurement and 
pricing mechanisms. 
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2. For similar reasons, IOF contracts will be more likely to incorporate third-
party verification or mediation. 
3. Again, due to more poorly aligned incentives and lower trust, negotiated 
contracts with IOFs will be more complete in specifying rights and 
responsibilities over a broader range of contingencies, thereby reducing the 
importance of residual control right issues. 
4. Along the same lines, IOF contractors will likely exert more decision rights 
control over the more easily specified and verifiable producer activities. 
5. The value paid to producers in IOF contracts will be less-directly correlated 
with the IOF’s net operating revenues. 
The first of these is particularly relevant to the current trends in agricultural 
specialization.  To the extent that the value source (e.g., embedded trait) in a particular 
product becomes more difficult to assess in a transparent way, IOFs are less likely to be 
able to implement pricing strategies that provide the most efficient incentives to 
producers.    
 
Alternative Producer Organizational Structures 
 The above discussion considers the stereotype polar cases of an IOF and a 
traditional producer-owned cooperative.  However, not all POFs are characterized by the 
same property rights and governance structures; there is a spectrum of hybrid producer-
owned organizational forms designed to mitigate the costs and hazards associated with 
the five vaguely defined property rights problems identified by Cook.7  Cook and 
Iliopoulos demonstrate that the ability of these different cooperative forms to reduce 
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some of those hazards affects producers’ investment incentives.  The broader implication 
is that different cooperative forms engender different types of relations with producers 
that are likely to be manifested in more than just equity investment decisions. 
 Open versus closed membership cooperatives typically encounter greater external 
free-rider problems.  One source of those problems is that the cooperative must purchase 
whatever volume and quality of product the producer chooses to deliver.  However, as the 
food system moves toward greater specialization and segregation of agricultural products, 
more coordination is required—something open-membership coops do not easily 
accommodate.  Therefore, POFs with more clearly delineated and specific delivery rights 
will be more effective in contracting with producers for high valued specialty products.   
 POFs with appreciable and transferable equity shares provide their producer-
owners with an alternative means of capturing value from the cooperative’s activities.  
Producers can either capture their equity returns through traditional patronage or usage-
based means, or through equity capital appreciation.  This creates a tension in the 
decision to reinvest earnings into the organization or to pay them out in patronage (not 
unlike the IOF’s decision to either reinvest earnings or pay dividends), particularly since 
taxes on capital appreciation are deferred until the producer liquidates her investment.  
This suggests POF’s with appreciable and transferable shares will reinvest a greater 
proportion of the value created through the POF and pay out a smaller portion of the 
value under the producer contracts (i.e., contract prices will be less-directly correlated 
with the POF’s net revenues). 
Multi-purpose cooperatives, where producer-owners have more heterogeneous 
investment interests, are subject to the portfolio problem—investments from the common 
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resource pool may benefit one group of owners more than, or at the expense of, another.  
Value premiums to producers of one commodity may be perceived as windfall by 
producers of other commodities.  Moreover, producers involved in different commodity 
production may not fully understand or appreciate the value and costs associated with the 
production of products with which they have little experience.  Therefore, POFs with 
multiple products and/or with a more heterogeneous group of producers will be less 
effective in offering contracts that accurately compensate producers for product-specific 
investments (either tangible such as equipment or intangible such as value or production 
uncertainties).  In addition, a smaller proportion of the residual income from the business 
line will be paid to producers in patronage form via the contract.  Finally, more 
transparent pricing and measurement tools will be used.   
POFs differ in the amount and type of up-front capital producers are required to 
invest in order to obtain delivery rights. At first blush, one might suggest that producers 
that are not required to put up a hostage in the form of collateral investment are more 
likely to shirk in their production relations with the firm, thus calling for greater 
contractual controls.  However, the value of delivery rights will be determined in large 
part by the expected returns on the delivery contracts and on the equity investment itself.  
Both depend on the nature of the product being produced.  Those products offering the 
highest returns are likely going to be ones that require higher degrees of managerial effort 
by producers, coordination between producers and the contractor, and product specificity 
on the side of the contractor.  All of these suggest the contract with the producers will be 
more complete and specific in its requirements.  While this is ultimately an empirical 
question, the corollary seems more clear: POFs that require less up-front investment from 
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producers are less likely to contract for specialized products that require specific 
investments from either party. 
 
Summary 
 Our objective in the above discussion is to advance a conceptual framework using 
new institutional economics theories that draws attention to the importance of the 
organizational structure of contractors for the design of the proliferation of contracts 
increasingly governing agricultural production.  Understanding the interplay between 
organizational form and contract structure is a necessary step in understanding why and 
how contracting is occurring, where and when it does.  The next step is to begin 
systematically examining actual contracts to empirically evaluate these theoretical 
conjectures—a process we have begun by initiating a collection of contract forms.8 
No doubt, competitive forces shape the structure of contracts—contractors can 
offer more appealing contract terms as well as higher prices when competing for a 
common pool of producers.  In fact, legal scholarship suggests contracts are likely to 
converge over time (e.g., the evolution of boilerplate).  However, few industries if any 
outside of agriculture have the breadth of distinctly different organizational forms 
involved in similar contracting activities.  The dramatically different incentives inherent 
in those organizational forms, both of the contracting organization itself and of the 
producer in relation to the contractor, suggest key contractual differences are likely to 
persist.  To the extent that those differences have economic consequences in the 
coordination efficiencies they facilitate, cooperatives may find a special niche in a more 
highly coordinated agri- food system.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1  While asymmetric information and externalities are not themselves new to traditional 
neoclassical economics, agency theory and related models are based on the concept of 
positive transaction costs, which distinguishes these new institutional theories from 
neoclassical theory.  The broad application of the principal-agent model in particular is 
evidence of how new institutional economics is integrating into the mainstream literature. 
2 This notion of complementary asset ownership includes concepts of market power as 
traditionally argued in the economics literature, particularly the monopsonistic market 
structure asserted to face most agricultural producers.  One could well consider a 
dominant market share as ownership of access rights to a downstream market.  Producers 
are faced with acquiring those access rights from the monopsonist (in the form of reduced 
prices) or purchasing alternative access rights through investment in a cooperative. 
3 This also provided grist for the aforementioned agency theory mill, the shareholder-
manager relationship characteristic of the separation of residual claims and asset control 
being a pre-eminent example of a principal-agent relationship.   
4 The incomplete contracting approach is more directed toward vertical integration issues 
than contract structure.  It may be a useful framework to consider integration as a 
mechanism to enhance coordination in the agriculture sector, but that leads more to the 
decision to form a cooperative (producers integrating downstream to capture more of the 
gains from coordination, for instance).  Hendrikse and Bijman address this very issue. 
5 Because the focus of this paper is on the ability of the contractor to improve 
coordination through contracting, our discussion and analysis is primarily related to 
downstream cooperatives (e.g., marketing coops) as opposed to upstream, or supply-type, 
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cooperatives.  While the value transfer works in the other direction, we suggest that the 
underlying issues would be similar in supply cooperative-producer relationships; 
however, we leave that as a question for future research. 
6 Balbach argues that trust was a key factor enabling the cooperative sugar processors to 
implement sugar-content pricing of beets whereas the IOF processors could not. 
7 It is for this reason we have introduced the term “producer-oriented firms (POFs).”  The 
defining characteristic for these firms is not so much their adherence to the traditional 
definition of a cooperative, but their orientation toward the producer rather than to 
independent investors.  For instance, we would consider a producer-owned and operated 
LLC a hybrid form of POF.   Indeed, an IOF whose shareholders are predominantly 
producers for the organization would also be a POF.  Employee-owned corporations 
would be a good example from outside agriculture, although most tend to suffer from a 
portfolio problem when dealing with employees from several different unions or 
professional strata. 
8 The Contracting and Organizations Research Initiative (CORI, http://cori.missouri.edu) 
at the University of Missouri is already engaged in developing a collection of agricultural 
production contracts (among many other types of contracts both in and out of agriculture) 
specifically to facilitate empirical research on contract structure and the effects of 
organizational and institutional structures surrounding the contracting activity. 
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